SCOTUS “Lowers The Bar” For Title VII Job Transfer Claims – Employment Litigation/ Tribunals

On April 17, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that employees alleging they were subjected to discriminatory job
transfers under Title VII need only show that they suffered some
harm from the forced transfer, but, notably, the alleged harm need
not be significant. In a unanimous decision, the Court in
Muldrow v. St. Louis resolved a circuit split regarding
the precise standard to be applied when a plaintiff alleges her job
transfer amounted to an adverse employment action sufficient to
support an unlawful discrimination claim.

MULDROW V. ST. LOUIS: THE BASICS

Muldrow centered on a female police sergeant who
alleged that her forced transfer from her role as an officer in the
St. Louis Police Department’s specialized Intelligence Division
to a new position in a different unit constituted unlawful gender
discrimination. While her rank and pay remained the same in the new
role, Muldrow established that the new role was less
“prestigious” and more “administrative” than
her prior role, she no longer worked with high-ranking officials,
she lost access to certain job perks, and she had a less-regular
schedule involving new weekend shifts.

The lower court granted summary judgment for Muldrow’s
employer and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow
failed to show that the transfer caused her a “materially
significant disadvantage” because the transfer did not result
in diminution to her title, salary, or benefits, and caused only
minor changes in her working conditions.

THE MAJORITY OPINION EXPLAINED

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit’s
decision, rejecting the “materially significant
disadvantage” standard as inconsistent with the plain language
of Title VII. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, explained
that the applicable statutory language “prohibits
‘discriminat[ing] against’ an individual ‘with
respect’ to the ‘terms [or] conditions’ of employment
because of that individual’s sex. That language requires
[plaintiffs] to show that the transfer brought about some
‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or
condition,” but does not require the heightened
showing that the transfer caused a “materially significant
disadvantage,” as such language appears nowhere in the
statute.

Justice Kagan explained that the Court’s decision
“changes the legal standard used in any circuit that has
previously required [plaintiffs to show they suffered]
‘significant,’ ‘material,’ or ‘serious’
injury. It lowers the bar Title VII plaintiffs must meet.”

CONCURRING OPINIONS ANTICIPATE MINIMAL FALLOUT

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas clarified that
the Court was not eliminating the “harm” element
altogether. Thus, the Court rejected Muldrow’s argument that a
Title VII plaintiff could state a claim simply by proving they were
transferred or denied a transfer based on a protected
characteristic, with no additional evidence of harm. Instead,
Justice Thomas explained the Court’s opinion still required
employees to show they suffered “an actual disadvantage as
compared to minor changes” to terms and conditions of
employment in order to establish a Title VII claim related to a job
transfer.

Justice Alito went one step further, anticipating the following
impact of the Court’s decision: “I see little if any
substantive difference between the terminology the Court approves
and the terminology it doesn’t like. The predictable result of
today’s decision is that careful lower court judges will mind
the words they use but will continue to do pretty much just what
they have done for years.”

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS

As a practical reality, the Muldrow decision is
unlikely to prompt a substantial shift in federal courts’
adjudication of Title VII claims, but could lead to an uptick in
Title VII cases generally.

The Court espoused the so-called “some harm” standard
without providing substantive context or instruction as to how the
standard should be applied moving forward. Justice Alito summarized
the Court’s ruling as follows: “Title VII plaintiffs must
show that the event they challenge constituted a ‘harm’ or
‘injury,’ but … the event need not be
‘significant’ or ‘substantial.'” He went on to
comment: “I have no idea what this means, and I can just
imagine how this guidance will be greeted by lower court
judges.”

Thus, judges across the country are left with the existing Title
VII framework, whereby employees are still required to show 1) they
suffered an adverse employment action “because of” a
protected characteristic; and 2) they suffered actual harm to the
“terms and conditions” of their employment, among other
elements.

While the Court’s decision could embolden plaintiffs by
ostensibly lowering their standard of proof, it will remain to be
seen whether the decision enhances employers’ risk in any
material way.

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